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ABSTRACT
Electoral democracies worldwide are all organised around elections but the rules 
under which the elections are organised differ greatly from one country to another. 
These electoral rules, such as whether voting is compulsory or what electoral 
system is used, are thought of as strongly affecting voters’ behaviour and the 
choices they make. If electoral rules indeed shape citizens’ electoral behaviour, the 
implication is that theories of what explains voters’ choices are country-specific as 
well. This is in sharp contrast to the idea that theories of electoral behaviour are 
generalisable. This special issue tackles this question and offers an assessment 
of the impact of electoral rules on voters’ behaviour, on the one hand, and the 
generalisability of individual-level theories of voting behaviour, on the other. The 
collection of papers furthermore offers an important contribution in terms of 
the kind of electoral rules that are scrutinised, with several papers focusing on 
the little-investigated phenomenon of preferential voting.
KEYWORDS electoral rules; electoral behaviour; electoral system; comparative research
Scholars of electoral behaviour commonly assume voting to be strongly affected 
by the institutional context in which citizens are embedded. Electoral rules, 
and efforts to change them, are highly salient topics in the public and political 
debate as well, because of the assumption that voters’ behaviour is affected by 
these rules and because of expectations that citizens would behave differently 
if the rules were changed. The general expectation, therefore, seems to be that 
electoral rules matter, because they will have an effect on voters, and therefore 
also on electoral outcomes. With the term ‘electoral rules’ we refer here to the 
rules under which elections are organised, such as whether voting is compul-
sory, or whether a majoritarian or proportional electoral system operates. In 
general, electoral rules are expected to influence whether and how citizens 
cast a vote. Moreover, we observe a very strong variation with regard to the 
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electoral systems functioning in various countries. Further, these systems tend 
to be rather resistant to any effort to change them (Farrell 2011). With a few 
exceptions, like Italy or New Zealand, electoral rules mostly can be regarded 
as stable country characteristics (Gallagher 1998). Therefore it makes sense to 
assume that these marked differences could have an impact on the way voters 
interact with the political system, most notably in the context of elections.
More than half a century ago Maurice Duverger (1951) claimed that elec-
toral systems fundamentally shape voting behaviour and its determinants. 
Since then, numerous scholars have investigated and reported on the effect of 
electoral rules on voters (Blais and Carty 1991). First, comparative work that 
describes electoral behaviour across a number of countries, where electoral 
rules vary in a significant manner, has given indications of fundamental differ-
ences. Research on electoral participation, for example, consistently finds higher 
turnout levels in countries with a proportional electoral system as compared 
to majoritarian electoral systems (Geys 2006). Compulsory voting rules, too, 
clearly have a positive effect on turnout levels, suggesting that these rules matter 
in the individual decision to vote (Birch 2013). Second, causality claims have 
been strengthened by experimental work on the impact of electoral systems. 
Van der Straeten and her colleagues (2010), for example, have run a series 
of laboratory experiments which conclude that the extent to which citizens 
vote strategically depends on electoral rules. Third, the low external validity 
of such lab experiments has been addressed by means of quasi- and natural- 
experimental studies. These studies also give indications of a non-negligible 
impact of electoral rules, on electoral participation as well as on voters’ choices 
(Fowler 2013; Karp and Banducci 1999). A recent study by Sanz (forthcoming) 
is exemplary in this regard. This paper exploits the natural variation in the elec-
toral rules of local elections in Spain, showing that turnout increases when local 
representatives are elected on open lists, as compared to closed-list elections. 
From this brief overview of previous work and different research strategies, it 
becomes evident that electoral rules seem to matter (Norris 2004). The decision 
to turn out to vote, not to mention what candidates or parties a voter chooses, 
are influenced by the rules of the game. Following Duverger, electoral systems 
apparently have strong and significant psychological effects.
This line of reasoning has indeed a solid theoretical basis. The presence of 
institutions, one assumes, shapes human behaviour and upholds this behaviour, 
since these norms are ultimately interiorised by the citizens. This kind of loyalty 
leads to social stability, as Parsons (1951) famously assumed in his classical 
theory. Electoral rules can be considered as part of the institutional framework 
of a society because they determine the allocation of power and because their 
stability plays a constitutive role in politics (Bowler and Donovan 2003). The 
agency of individual voters and citizens, therefore, should be bound by these 
electoral rules. This implies that norms of rational behaviour by citizens can 
also vary, depending, for example, on whether the institutions they live in are 
based on a majoritarian or a representative logic.
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While electoral systems are generally found to matter for the vote choice, a 
more fundamental theoretical implication of Duverger’s work tends to be unap-
preciated. That is, the claim that electoral systems have a systematic and strong 
impact on voters calls into question the generalisability of vote choice models, 
across countries and electoral systems. Scholars examining the determinants of 
the vote choice have devoted quite some attention and effort to detecting gen-
eral patterns. Theories, survey methods, as well as question wording for crucial 
concepts have travelled from one country to another. Originally, similarities 
in the question wording of survey items of national election surveys in differ-
ent countries were the result of rather ad hoc efforts by ‘“missionaries” from 
Michigan’, the birthplace of the highly influential American National Election 
Studies (Knight and Marsh 2002: 173). Recently, more systematic efforts at 
harmonisation have been undertaken ‒ for example, the True European Voter 
project has set out to harmonise the data from existing election studies across 
Europe, so allowing the testing of fundamental theories of voting behaviour. 
In addition, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project offers 
a leading example of coordination in data gathering, as it revolves around the 
administration of identical questions in election studies from over 50 democ-
racies worldwide. These large data efforts are in part inspired by the notion that 
comparative analyses will allow us to shed more light on the general charac-
teristics of the vote choice process.
Such efforts permit a more systematic assessment of the generalisability of 
some fundamental theories. These theories of the voting behaviour originate 
mostly, though not exclusively, from scholars investigating electoral behaviour 
in the United States. Take, for example, the focus on partisanship as a key 
variable for explaining voters’ behaviour and choices. While the concept of 
partisanship emanates from the ground-breaking work of Campbell and his 
colleagues (1960), many other scholars have sought to measure and verify its 
impact on the vote choice in countries worldwide, assuming that the concept 
of partisanship could be present in other political systems as well (Bartle and 
Bellucci 2014; Lupu 2015). Similarly, theories of economic voting have travelled 
from the United States, where they were originally proposed and tested, to a 
large and varied set of electoral contexts (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). 
Many more examples could be referred to, such as work on strategic voting – 
which has been examined in majoritarian as well as in proportional electoral 
systems (Gschwend 2007) – or work on the impact of party leaders on the 
vote choice (Aarts et al. 2013). These studies share a fairly obvious conviction 
that some fundamental theories of voting behaviour are generalisable across 
a large and varied set of contexts. Finding that patterns are generalisable can 
be important from a normative point of view as well. Citizens using their vote 
to hold incumbents and politicians accountable for their performance stands 
as a key aspect of elections, one allowing for the realisation of representative 
democracy (Przeworski et al. 1999). Holding politicians accountable is, indeed, 
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an essential component of democracy. As such, finding economic voting in a 
large and varied set of democracies bears witness to their well-functioning, 
representative nature.
The essential challenge of Duverger’s work, however, lies in the impact of 
institutional and systemic differences between countries. If he is right, and 
electoral systems fundamentally shape voters’ behaviour and the choices they 
make, differences in electoral rules severely limit the potential to generalise 
research results on the individual-level factors that explain the vote. The impact 
of electoral rules could be such that the effect of individual-level determi-
nants on the vote depends on specific characteristics of the electoral system. To 
express it differently, maybe in some countries one specific set of vote choice 
determinants is important, while in other countries, with different electoral 
rules, a totally different set of determinants might affect citizens’ vote choices. 
That could mean that the search for generally applicable vote choice models is in 
vain, because the vote choice process is highly context-specific. In that case, the 
obvious conclusion should be that it is impossible to determine universal vote 
choice determinants, since voters tend to respond to a specific set of electoral 
rules. In summary, the effect of the electoral system on the vote choice process 
can be seen as a major challenge for electoral research and the generalisability 
of theories of voting behaviour, a challenge not often seriously addressed. The 
goal of this special issue is to offer such an assessment by investigating in a sys-
tematic and comparative manner what impact electoral rules have on specific 
vote choice processes and determinants.
The micro- and the macro-level, direct and indirect effects
When assessing the impact of electoral rules on the vote choice process, it is 
important to distinguish between different levels of analysis. Electoral rules are 
macro-variables specific to a particular context and usually highly stable – as 
is evident from some recent failed attempts to reform the electoral system in 
Britain and several Canadian provinces (Fournier et al. 2011; Whiteley et al. 
2013). The vote, in contrast, is a micro-level variable, as it is individual citizens 
who decide whether to turn out to vote and whom to vote for in the polling 
booth. Any analysis of the impact of electoral rules has to be attentive to this 
difference in levels, because the problem of ecological fallacy implies that we 
cannot straightforwardly make inferences about individuals’ behaviour from 
an aggregate-level analysis.
The literature on electoral rules does include a large number of studies that 
focus exclusively on the macro-level. Work in this tradition has offered impor-
tant insights and a number of aggregate-level findings on the consequences of 
electoral rules prove to be quite robust. To mention only one example, levels of 
turnout are consistently found to be higher under proportional representation 
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(PR) rules. Aggregate-level studies have a number of important advantages, 
such as the fact that they rely on precise estimates of the vote share or turn-
out, and not on respondents’ reported behaviour, which is more error-prone. 
Aggregate-level studies, however, do not allow strong conclusions to be drawn 
about individuals’ political behaviour. Substantial variation in citizens’ char-
acteristics and attitudes can simply not be accounted for by an analysis of 
aggregate turnout patterns. Observed differences between countries that are 
ascribed to different electoral rules might therefore well be spurious.
It is such concerns that have motivated scholars to develop datasets that 
would allow the impact of electoral systems to be examined by means of indi-
vidual-level analyses. The data from the CSES project, for example, consist of 
individual-level measures of citizens’ behaviour as well as their attitudes in a 
large set of democracies. By means of these data, or by pooling other survey data 
from different countries, research designs can be developed that allow the con-
sequences of differences in electoral rules at the individual level to be assessed.
Assessing the impact of electoral rules at the individual level is also theo-
retically important, because aggregate-level differences should be grounded in 
individual-level mechanisms. While some macro-level findings on electoral 
rules are strong and robust, our understanding of the individual-level mech-
anisms explaining these macro-observations is still limited (Blais and Aarts 
2006). A number of scholars have used the available comparative individu-
al-level survey data to investigate such questions, and to examine the impact 
of contextual factors by means of individual-level data. Surprisingly, however, 
these studies do not always corroborate the strong macro-level evidence. The 
detailed analysis by Brockington (2004) of individual-level sources of turnout 
on CSES data, for example, did not allow him to unveil what individual-level 
mechanisms explain why turnout is higher under PR rules. This only adds to 
the theoretical puzzle: empirically we know there are strong differences between 
countries. If, however, there is no direct impact of country-level variables on 
the behaviour of citizens, it remains a challenge to explain the occurrence of 
these differences, since other causal mechanisms must be at play. Electoral rules 
might, for example, have an effect because they affect political actors’ behaviour. 
Hooghe et al. (2006), for example, suggest that the effects of electoral reform 
(specifically the introduction of an electoral threshold in Belgium) cannot be 
explained by the effect it had on individual voters, but solely by the effect it had 
on the strategic and anticipatory behaviour of political parties. While on an 
aggregate level one might draw the conclusion that changing the rules would 
have had an effect on voters’ behaviour, this clearly was not the case.
As an additional advantage, individual-level comparative research allows 
for looking beyond the direct effects of electoral rules on citizens’ political 
behaviour. Individual-level theories of the vote choice usually depart from quite 
general models and assume that some traditional vote choice determinants, 
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such as partisanship or the economy, affect voters’ decisions in the same way 
across democracies. By combining individual-level data from different coun-
tries and settings, one can relax this assumption, and verify whether citizens’ 
vote choice calculus is effectively the same regardless of the electoral rules. 
Doing so, we gain insights into the indirect effects of electoral systems, as 
well as in how electoral rules moderate individual-level mechanisms. Previous 
work along these lines that examined the indirect and moderating impact of 
electoral rules, however, has not given indications of a strong impact of elec-
toral rules. This observation has led Thomassen (2014b: 19) to conclude that 
‘Political institutions are less relevant for people’s attitudes and behaviour than 
often presumed’. If this observation is correct, it would imply that (changing) 
electoral systems should not have a major impact on the way voters make up 
their mind. If, however, electoral rules do not fundamentally alter the vote 
choice calculus of citizens, then scholarly efforts to generalise and apply similar 
vote choice models in varying electoral contexts appears a sound and sensible 
research strategy.
The rather weak and sometimes even conflicting results from previous 
work (Thomassen 2014a) that has combined aggregate- and individual-level 
approaches clarify that macro- and the micro-approaches toward the expla-
nation of electoral behaviour are in need of further dialogue. One goal of this 
special issue is to contribute to this ongoing debate by offering new empirical 
evidence on the impact of electoral rules and institutions on determinants of 
individual-level voter behaviour.
The articles that are included in this special issue rely on different datasets 
and the methodological approaches that are used are also varied. A number of 
papers are focused on the macro-level, while other articles in this collection 
examine the impact of electoral rules by means of individual-level datasets. The 
individual-level analyses differ as well, with some papers focusing on the direct 
effects of electoral rules on individuals’ behaviour and other papers aiming to 
disentangle the indirect and moderating effects of electoral rules. Bringing 
together research that examines the effects of electoral rules from different 
angles and with different types of datasets makes for a collection of papers that 
reflects well the state of the art in this field. In addition, since each approach 
has advantages and disadvantages, a combination of methods offers the most 
comprehensive view of how electoral rules matter for the vote choice.
The papers in this special issue are innovative in a number of ways. Several 
papers focus on aspects of electoral systems that have so far received little atten-
tion in the literature. Most importantly, three of the articles included take into 
account different ways in which electoral systems allow voting for candidates 
and how that affects citizens’ behaviour. In this way, the papers are taking new 
steps that will undoubtedly inspire more research on the topic.
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Structure and contributions of this special issue
The first paper by Peter Söderlund (2017) is a macro-level study of the impact 
of candidate-centred electoral systems on turnout. By means of a thorough 
analysis of data from 36 democracies since 1990, the author examines whether 
electoral systems that focus more on candidates increase or on the contrary 
depress turnout. The results show that turnout is lower in candidate-centred sys-
tems. This finding holds regardless of what indicator of candidate-centredness 
is used and it appears to be robust for a large number of control variables, such 
as the number of parties in a system, or how disproportional an electoral system 
is. Söderlund’s analysis thus offers strong evidence of a systemic effect of elec-
toral rules on electoral participation; aggregate levels of participation are lower 
when candidate-based ballots are used. Söderlund also offers a suggestion for 
an individual-level mechanism that could explain this aggregate-level pattern: 
candidate-centred systems broaden the number of options a voter can choose 
from, rendering voting more cognitively challenging. The aggregate-level data 
used in the article do not allow this individual-level mechanism to be put to 
the test, but Söderlund’s strong macro-level findings clearly can set the agenda. 
While it is often assumed that a focus on candidates might make voting more 
appealing for voters, this can also lead to a cognitive overload, leading to absten-
tion by potential voters. The article calls for more research to disentangle the 
consequences of the extent to which electoral systems are candidate-centred.
The second paper by Ruth Dassonneville and Michael Lewis-Beck (2017) 
offers an aggregate-level analysis as well, but the focus is shifted from turnout to 
voters’ choices. This paper relies on a database of 474 elections in 34 countries to 
examine cross-national variation in economic voting. In the analysis, the impact 
of changes in GDP growth on the incumbent vote share is analysed. Previous 
research has argued that the extent to which incumbents are held accountable 
for the state of the economy depends on institutional rules and the distribution 
of power. That is, studies have found the economy to affect the incumbent’s 
vote share in high-clarity contexts only, but not in contexts where it is less 
clear who is responsible for government decisions. Dassonneville and Lewis-
Beck, however, test this expectation interactively and they find that economic 
voting is not significantly weaker in low-clarity contexts than in high-clarity 
contexts. This holds regardless of whether they look at institutional rules such 
as the electoral system or whether they consider patterns of power sharing. 
From these essentially null results, Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck conclude that 
economic voting is a more general pattern than regularly assumed. The impact 
of electoral rules on economic voting, while not absent, is hence more limited 
than is generally assumed, implying that economic voting can be considered 
as a rather general pattern within electoral democracies.
Liisa Talving’s (2017) article also examines economic voting cross-nationally, 
though her efforts differ in two important respects from the previous paper. 
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First, she examines economic voting by means of individual-level data, obtained 
from the European Election Studies (EES) project. Second, Talving does not 
focus on reward and punishment for economic growth, but examines voters’ 
reaction to the economic policies that governments implement. Talving pools 
data from 24 European countries and three EES studies (2004, 2009 and 2014), 
which allows her to compare voting behaviour before and after the outbreak of 
the economic and financial crisis starting in 2008. Talving finds that govern-
ments that pursued austerity measures were punished by voters, but only in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis. This indication of economic policy voting, 
furthermore, is found to be fairly general, as Talving finds no indications of this 
effect being conditional on the extent to which national governments are tied 
by supranational or international institutions. In line with Dassonneville and 
Lewis-Beck’s results on economic performance voting, thus, Talving’s findings 
show effects that are quite general, regardless of important cross-national dif-
ferences in her sample.
Pedro Riera and Damien Bol’s contribution (2017) examines patterns of split-
ticket voting in two types of mixed-member electoral systems: mixed-member 
proportional systems (MMP) on the one hand and mixed-member majoritarian 
(MMM) systems on the other. Riera and Bol argue that these different systems 
offer different incentives for split-ticket voting. More specifically, they theorise 
that under MMP rules, voters have more incentives to desert their preferred 
party for the candidate vote than under MMM systems, because the vote they 
cast for a candidate of another party does not affect the proportion of seats in 
parliament their preferred party will obtain. Riera and Bol make use of elec-
tion survey data from seven different electoral contexts and offer indications 
that split-ticket voting is indeed higher under MMP rules, and this finding is 
robust to controlling for a series of relevant correlates of split-ticket voting. 
Even though the data that Riera and Bol muster are somewhat limited and 
cover a select number of countries, their results are in line with expectations. 
In showing important effects on voting behaviour of what seems like a minor 
element of electoral system engineering, they make a strong argument that 
scholars of electoral systems and voting behaviour should pay attention to the 
full complexity of electoral rules ‒ and not rely on a crude categorisation of 
electoral systems only when examining the impact of electoral rules.
The next contribution in this special issue is by Audrey André and Sam 
Depauw (2017), who examine the determinants of casting preference votes 
for candidates. The paper focuses on electoral systems where voters can either 
vote for a party list or support specific candidates and sets out to examine the 
impact of institutional rules on the probability of casting preference votes. 
André and Depauw use data from the CSES project and complement this with 
survey data from Belgium, which allows them to analyse preference voting in six 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Latvia, Sweden and Switzerland). 
They present a district-level analysis as well as analyses using individual-level 
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data, which allow them to examine whether some voters are more affected by 
institutional rules than others. The findings of André and Depauw suggest 
that institutional rules matter; voters are more likely to cast preference votes 
when they have a limited number of candidates to choose from and when these 
preference votes effectively influence who gets a seat in parliament. The results 
of this paper furthermore show that institutional rules matter more for highly 
politically sophisticated voters, suggesting that they are significant only for 
those voters who understand the rules of the game.
A final paper in this collection examines the effects of compulsory voting 
rules on the quality of the vote choice. Using data from the CSES project, Ruth 
Dassonneville, Marc Hooghe and Peter Miller (2017) analyse the determi-
nants of the vote choice in over 100 elections worldwide. They focus on two 
vote choice determinants that are deemed important in the normative liter-
ature on representative democracy; accountability and proximity. For exam-
ining accountability mechanisms, they focus on economic voting and assess 
the impact of GDP growth as well as unemployment rates on voting for an 
incumbent party. Proximity voting is operationalised in a traditional way and 
relates to ideological proximity in terms of left and right. The results that are 
presented in this paper show an interesting contrast between accountability 
on the one hand and proximity voting on the other. Compulsory voting rules 
do not seem to affect the extent to which incumbents are held accountable for 
the state of the economy. These results add further evidence to the observa-
tions of Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck as well as those of Talving. Economic 
considerations affect voters’ choices in a fairly general way, and institutions or 
electoral rules do not appear to hamper such behaviour. In terms of proximity 
voting, in contrast, Dassonneville et al. find that voters are less likely to vote 
for the most proximate party when voting is mandatory.
Conclusion: what effect do electoral rules have on electoral 
behaviour?
The overall conclusion from these articles suggests that the general claim about 
the psychological effects of electoral rules needs to be qualified. To some extent 
voters are influenced by electoral rules, and they adapt their behaviour accord-
ingly. Especially with regard to the question on what ground voters decide to 
vote for a list or for one or more specific candidates, we have observed signif-
icant differences across political systems. This finding does pose a challenge 
for efforts to arrive at generalisable models for explaining voting behaviour: as 
the vote choice process of citizens seems be heavily influenced by specifics of 
the electoral system, one cautious suggestion for future research should be that 
these between-country variations should play a role in comparative research. 
Importantly, we find distinctions in the extent to which citizens are influenced 
by electoral rules. Political sophistication seems to play a key role here, since 
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the most sophisticated voters apparently understand the rules better, or are 
better able to adapt their behaviour to fit with the electoral rules. Insight into 
the working of the electoral rules, therefore, might be an element permitting 
sophisticated voters to express their vote more effectively. If voters do not fully 
understand the consequences of electoral rules, this limits their ability to use 
those rules to get their voice heard in the policy process. This, too, is a sobering 
conclusion. Within the field of political science, various proposals have been put 
on the table, in order to arrive at electoral reform. Whatever the scientific merits 
of these proposals, increasing the complexity of an electoral system comes at 
a price, as it allows the more sophisticated to use their vote more strategically, 
while lessening the transparency of the political process, especially for voters 
with lower levels of political sophistication.
Some other vote choice determinants, like economic voting, on the other 
hand, seem to be so prevalent that they are apparently immune to this kind of 
country-level influence. They appear quite general, making it worthwhile to 
investigate further what kind of voting motives can, indeed, be seen as ‘uni-
versal’. For future research, the question does remain open whether electoral 
accountability, as operationalised by economic voting, really is as robust to the 
effect of electoral rules as it appears to be based on these results. Moreover, 
this finding has an importance from a normative point of view. It has been 
argued repeatedly that realising representation and accountability are the two 
main functions of elections. If that is the case, both functions should be robust 
against a wide array of forms of electoral engineering. Electoral engineering, as 
it has been called, should therefore be tailored to meet the most fundamental 
functions of democracy: representation and accountability.
Based on the results of the articles included in this special issue, our con-
clusions might appear to be a bit middle of the road. Obviously, electoral rules 
do have an impact on some element of the vote decision process. With regard 
to candidate voting, or the decision to turn out or not, we do see important 
differences across countries. Apparently, there is a sufficient level of agency 
among citizens to ensure that they react to the possibilities and limits that are 
offered by the electoral system. It is important, however, to refer back to the 
two main functions of elections in a democratic political system: representa-
tion and accountability. As we have seen, representation can be influenced by 
changing electoral rules. Abolishing compulsory voting, for example, almost 
automatically ensures that the electorate will be less representative for the 
voting age population as a whole. Complex systems of voter registration can 
further erode the representative function of elections. On the other hand, for 
the main voting motives that help to enable the accountability function of elec-
toral democracy, there seems to be sufficient evidence that they are remarkably 
robust. No matter what the electoral rules might be, incumbents do seem to be 
held accountable for the way they have managed the national economy. This 
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accountability mechanism, which is at the heart of electoral democracy, seems 
to a large extent to be remarkably resistant to country-level differences, and 
both from a normative point of view, as from the perspective of comparative 
political science, this is rather good news.
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